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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

This RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING is submitted by the
Division

of

Securities

(hereinafter

the

"Division") and

the

Department of Commerce of the State of Utahf Respondents in this
appeal, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and at the specific request of the Court.
The Respondents believe that the Court made a minor error in
citing Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 on page 8 of its opinion
of November 29, 1991 (hereinafter the "Opinion"). The Respondents
believe that the Court meant to cite to Utah Code Annotated section
61-1-14(3).

Otherwise, the Respondents believe that the Opinion

correctly resolves all of the issues raised in this appeal.
I. THE COURT INCORRECTLY CITED TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
61-1-12 ON PAGE 8 OF THE OPINION, BUT THAT ERROR DOES NOT AFFECT
THE VALIDITY OF THE OPINION BECAUSE A STOP TRADING ORDER UNDER
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 61-1-14(3) IS FUNCTIONALLY THE
EQUIVALENT OF ONE UNDER SECTION 61-1-12.
The second paragraph of page 8 of the Opinion includes two
references to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 (1989).1

The

Court implies that the stop trading order was issued under section
12.

That is incorrect.

The stop trading order in this case was

!

Contrary to the Petitioners' assertions in their Petition for
Rehearing, the remainder of the Opinion appears to be based
correctly on section 14(3). The only references to section 12 are
those contained on page 8; other references in the Opinion to the
stop trading order correctly identify it as a section 14(3) order.
See, e.g., Opinion at 16, 18 (quoting the Division's March 1, 1989
stop trading order).
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issued under Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3)(1989) .2

The

Court's mistaken reference to section 12, rather than section
14(3), on page 8 of the Opinion does not affect the analysis of the
case, however.

The Opinion states that

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-12 (1989) grants the executive
director blanket authority to issue a stop order in
several enumerated circumstances. In addition, Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-12(2)(C)(i) (1989) states: "If no hearing is
requested and none is ordered by the division or
executive director, the order shall remain in effect
until it is modified or vacated by the executive
director." By its plain language, the statute grants
broad discretionary powers to the executive director to
either call for a hearing, modify or leave in effect the
stop trading order that has been entered.
The same can be said for stop trading orders issued under section
14(3).

Section 14(3) gives the director the authority to stop

trading in an unregistered security by revoking or denying the
effectiveness and availability of exemptions from the registration
requirements.

(As the Opinion correctly notes on page 14, "[s]ince

the stock was unregistered and was not eligible for any exemptions
to registration, it could not lawfully be the subject of any
transaction.")

Likewise, section 14(3) includes the following

language, which is almost identical to the language from section 12
quoted in the Opinion:

"If no hearing is requested and none is

ordered by the executive director or division, the order will

2

There are a number of differences between section 12 and
section 14(3) stop trading orders, as explained in the Brief of
Respondents at pages 42-44, but the main difference is that section
12 stop trading orders are issued when a company has registered
with the Utah Division of Securities, while section 14(3) stop
trading orders are issued when a company has not registered, but is
trading on the basis of an alleged exemption from the registration
requirements.
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remain in effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive
director."

U.C.A.

§ 61-1-14(3)(1989).

Thus, the Opinion's

analysis on page 8 that section 12 "grants broad discretionary
powers to the executive director to either call for a hearing,
modify or leave in effect the stop trading order that has been
entered"

applies equally well to section

14(3) stop trading

orders.3
In short, while a minor amendment to the Opinion would be
appropriate, replacing the page 8 references to section 12 with
references to section 14(3) and slightly altering the quote, the
analysis contained in the Opinion remains valid with respect to
section 14(3) stop trading orders such as the one in this case.
II. THE JOHNSONS CONTINUE TO FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE
SANCTIONED FOR ENGAGING IN DISHONEST AND UNETHICAL PRACTICES IN
THE SECURITIES BUSINESS.
The arguments raised in the remaining points of the Petition
for Rehearing show that the Johnsons have never quite understood
that they were administratively sanctioned for violating industry
norms by engaging in dishonest and unethical practices in the
securities business. The Johnsons continually try to shift burdens
of proof, raise non-issues, and apply incorrect legal standards,
leading the Respondents to wonder, inter
3

alia,

whether the Johnsons

For the record, it should be noted that while the Johnsons
have made numerous arguments in their original briefs and in the
Petition for Rehearing to the effect that the stop trading order is
invalid or unconstitutional, they lack standing to raise those
arguments. Although they were aware of the stop trading order on
the day it was issued, they failed to either (1) object to it
becoming permanent or (2) seek to have it modified or vacated.
- 3 -

think that they have been convicted of felonies, rather than having
been temporarily denied the privilege of professional licensure.
For

example,

Point

II

of

the

Petition

for

Rehearing,

concerning whether a section 14(2) exemption is required for
purchasing

a

security,

fails

to

recognize

that

administrative action based on unethical conduct.

this

is an

The scope of

unethical conduct encompasses much more than merely that conduct
which is not illegal. As this Court recently noted in Heinecke v.
Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 466 (1991):
In contrast to the unfairness in imposing criminal
liability on a run-of-the-mill citizen under a statute
which does not clearly proscribe the conduct complained
of, as a result of their training, testing, and
licensure, members of a profession are properly charged
with knowledge of what conduct is inconsistent with their
responsibilities as professionals notwithstanding some
lack of precision or comprehensiveness in the statutes
and rules governing their licensure."
The

record

provides

substantial

evidence

that

the

Johnsons

knowingly engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with their
responsibilities as professionals, even if the conduct was not
civilly

or

criminally

actionable.

Among

other

things, the

Securities Advisory Board had no trouble concluding that the
Johnsons' purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock after the Division's
March

1, 1989

stop trading

order

"frustrated

the Division's

appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those securities and
thus partially emasculated the effect of the March 1, 1989 Order,"
Record, at page 1138. Such conduct by a professional, designed to
subvert

the professional's

unethical.

regulatory agency, is prima

Thus, even assuming, arguendo,
- 4 -

facie

that the Johnsons were

to show that their purchases of stock were not illegal, they have
not met their burden of showing that the Securities Advisory Board
acted

irrationally

in

determining

that

their

behavior

was

unethical.A
Likewise, the Johnsons are obsessed with attempting to prove
(in Point III of the Petition for Rehearing) that they did not "aid
and abet" a violation of the securities act, even though they were
not sanctioned for having aided and abetted in the narrow legal
sense of the term. While Count One of the Amended Petition brought
against the Johnsons contains an assertion that the Johnsons'
actions encouraged or aided violations of the law,5 Count Two
contains no language about aiding.

Record, at 165-167.

The

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the
Securities Advisory Board against the Johnsons is based solely on
the theory that the Johnsons had acted dishonestly and unethically
by willfully violating the Division's stop trading order; there is
not one mention of the Johnsons being censured for having "aided
and abetted" a violation of law.

Record, at 1129-1142.

Thus,

Point III of the Petition for Rehearing, concerning whether a mere

A

0f course, the Respondents do not concede for a second that
the Johnsons' behavior was lawful. The Court's Opinion is correct
when it states that " [s]ince the stock was unregistered and was not
eligible for any exemptions to registration, it could not lawfully
be the subject of any transaction." Opinion, at page 14.
5

The Johnsons have utterly failed to recognize, and therefor
address, the fact that encouraging a violation of the securities
laws could be deemed a dishonest and unethical practice even if it
did not rise to the level of technical "aiding and abetting."
- 5 -

purchase

of

non-exempt

stock6

is

"aiding

and

abetting,"

is

irrelevant.7
In Point IV of the Petition for Rehearing, the Johnsons show
that they do not understand their duty to first "marshall the
evidence" before attacking the Division's administrative ruling.
They assert that they did marshall the evidence because "all of the
facts were stipulated to with the exception of Finding No. 14 . .
Petition for Rehearing, at page 6.

Not true. At least two of

the most important facts supporting the Division's action were not
contained in the Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of Hearing.
Those facts are:

(1) Judge Green's finding that Johnson-Bowles

knew or should have known (and was chargeable with knowledge) of
the illegal trading of the U.S.A. medical stock before the Johnsons
sold short; and (2) the Johnsons' own damning letter of March 21,
1989 to the NASD in which they themselves argue that "any trading
of or transaction involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, would

6

0f course, the Johnsons did more than merely purchase nonexempt stock. They purchased stock in violation of a stop trading
order. The Respondents believe that such a purchase constitutes
both a direct violation of the law and aiding and abetting a
violation by the seller.
7

Likewise irrelevant is the case of Jessup, Josephthal & Co.
v. Piquet & Cie, cited in Counsel for Petitioners' letter to the
Court of January 7, 1992.
Even assuming, arguendo,
that the
present case involved an "aiding and abetting" theory, Jessup has
nothing to do with whether a party can be administratively
sanctioned for having aided another in violating the securities
laws. Instead, it deals with the entirely different question of
when a plaintiff in a civil action, who claims that the defendant
was aiding and abetting a third party in committing securities
fraud against the plaintiff, is barred by the doctrine of in pari
delicto
due to the plaintiff's own participation in the fraudulent
scheme.
- 6 -

have been and is unlawful" even without reference to the Division's
stop trading order. The Johnsons' briefs failed to marshall those
facts or the other facts favorable to the Division before attacking
the Division's actions.
In all of their briefs, the Johnsons have utterly failed in
their duty of showing that the Division's actions were irrational
in light of the facts, such as those just mentioned, that favor the
Division.

Thus the Court was correct in declining to analyze many

of the claims by the Johnsons that required a factual determination
of the reasonableness of the Securities Advisory Board's actions.
Point V of the Petition for Rehearing is a mere ad

hominem

attack on the Court, and as such it does not dignify any extended
response.8
The Respondents must admit that they do not fully understand
Point VI of the Petition for Rehearing, which seems to indicate
that the Johnsons think that the Opinion holds that they are guilty
of dishonest and unethical behavior simply because they failed to
prevail on their Rule 12 motions.

The Johnsons claim that the

Opinion does not explain why their behavior is dishonest and
8

Three brief points about selective enforcement with regard to
the U.S.A. Medical stock fraud.
First, several of the key
participants have been convicted of federal or state felonies, and
at least one is serving extended back to back federal and state
prison sentences. Second, Susan Slattery's situation is factually
very different from that of the Johnsons, and she obtained a
specific "no action letter" from the division in advance which held
that the Utah Division of Securities had no jurisdiction over the
exclusively out of state transaction that she envisioned. Finally,
as to other participants in illegal trades who have not yet been
punished, the State has only limited resources to devote to any one
case, and those resources were largely absorbed by the Johnsons'
litigiousness.
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unethical.

As the Court correctly points out on page 16, the "if

he finds" language in Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (1989)
gives the executive director great latitude in determining what
constitutes "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities
business."
director's

The

Opinion

discretion

never

suggests

is absolute.

The

that

the

standard

executive
is one of

reasonableness, and the Opinion's factual recitations set forth an
ample basis for a finding that the Johnsons' actions were dishonest
and unethical. Every fact finder who has looked at this case, from
Judge Green, to Administrative Law Judge Eklund, to the Securities
Advisory Board, to Division of Securities Director Baldwin, to
Department of Commerce Executive Director Buhler, and finally to
this Court, has come to the conclusion that far from being innocent
victims

of

fraud,

the

Johnsons

are

clever

actors

who

were

chargeable with knowledge of the U.S.A. Medical fraud and who
attempted to manipulate the system to their maximum benefit.

As

the Opinion so cogently puts it on page 17:
It would be difficult to imagine a more willful violation
of an order than that presented in this case.
The
Johnsons sought relief in federal district court, and
when such relief was not forthcoming, they went to the
Division of Securities to seek such relief. Having been
granted the relief they sought from the Division, in the
form of the stop trading order, they immediately turned
around and began violating the very order for which in
large part they were responsible.
In short, it is impossible to read the Opinion (or, for that matter
the full record in this case) and not understand that the decision
to sanction the Johnsons for dishonest and unethical conduct was
based upon ample evidence, and not the mere whim of the executive
- 8 -

director.
The Conclusion portion of the Petition for Rehearing is mostly
an attempt to resuscitate many of the arguments that the Opinion
correctly labeled as being without merit.

For example, the

Johnsons insist on revisiting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-7920,
and have even attached another copy of that Release to the
Petition.

The Respondents never addressed the release in either

their brief or oral argument because they felt that it was
unambiguously irrelevant to this case. Release No. 34-79209 states
in part that
It is the position of the [SEC] that where the broker or
dealer is himself acting in good faith, where he is not
connected with the activity announced by the Commission
as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or
Section 19(a)(4), and where he has no reason to believe
that his customer is so connected, no objection need be
raised under such sections because the broker-dealer
completes his contractual obligations in the particular
transaction (e.g. by payment or delivery) while the
suspension is still in effect. . . .
A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate
such a transaction, must of course consider not only the
provisions of Sections 15(c)(5) and (19)(a)(4) but also
all other applicable provisions of the Federal securities
laws.
Putting aside the fact that the Johnsons cannot rely upon the
Release because they were "connected with the activity" at issue,
at least in Judge Green's view, it is clear that the Release only
concerns itself with whether completing a contractual obligation by
payment or delivery violates certain specific federal securities

9

Which, by the way, is nothing more than a statement by the
SEC as to its policy in 1966, based on old law. By itself, the
Release is not law, and it certainly is not binding on the Utah
Division of Securities.
- 9 -

laws. If the Johnsons had both sold short and purchased the shares
to cover the short sale before the stop trading order was in place,
and if they were being sanctioned for merely finalizing delivery of
already purchased securities, then the Release might be of some
interest. The Releasef however, stops considerably short of saying
that a broker-dealer may (and much less that a broker-dealer must)
purchase stock10 in blatant violation of a state stop trading order
simply so as to cover a short position created before the stop
trading order went into effect.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Opinion should be amended so as to replace the references
on page 8 to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-12 with correct
references to Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3).

Otherwise,

the Opinion is a correct and accurate statement of the law as it
applies to this casef and it should not be modified.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of January, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID N. SONNENREICH
Assistant Attorney General

10

While some argument could be made that the short sale was
still open at the time of the stop trading order, and therefor
could have been finalized by delivery under the terms of the
Release, the purchase of new stock to cover the short sale was a
separate transaction, and not merely the equivalent of payment or
delivery.
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